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position and overlapping of Uzbek, Turkmen and Karakalpak in the Khorezm area, and of Uzbek and Turkmen in the area along the eastern frontier of Turkmenia, has produced border dialects which show strong traces of mutual influence, particularly in phonetics. The only sharp 'language frontier' is indeed that between the Kazaks and the Uzbeks — a fact which suggests the social and ethnic divergence between the steppe-dwellers and the more sedentary population of the south. Stock-origins are confused by migration and exchange, but this language frontier today is clear enough. It is not blurred by the existence of small Kazak groups, usually known as Kipchak Uzbeks, on Uzbek linguistic territory within Uzbekistan. The language there has sometimes been mistakenly regarded as the true Uzbek, but is in fact just a Kazak dialect and it is noteworthy that, in spite of the geographical overlap between these people and their Uzbek surroundings, they do not mix or intermarry much with their neighbours, so carrying the language distinction into their social life.

General ethnology provides us with numerous examples of cases in which speakers of any particular language have taken over their present tongue from other speakers, partly or completely losing their own in the process. The language of a particular tribe or people is, therefore, not necessarily an indication of that people's stock-origin and relations, and any evidence of the kind can only be used with the greatest care. Nevertheless, I venture to affirm that, for the greater part of the population in this part of the world, language does in fact give some indication of the peoples' stock-origin. This conclusion is justified if we bear in mind an important social factor, namely, that nomadic, semi-nomadic, or forcibly settled tribes speaking a Turkic language can safely be regarded as being of Turkish origin. This is because the Turk entered history as a nomad; it follows that, if nomadic antecedents are still attributable to him and he still speaks a Turkic tongue, that is strong evidence of his Turkish stock.

With sedentary and town populations speaking Tajik it can as safely be accepted that they are of Iranian stock-origin.

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side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.

Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] Cat. 116 p105 - Anal pt 2 Bib. II, 8, R. E. Pipes.

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The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view

[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

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to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

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was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky, whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply, and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows is best told in Togan's own words:[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

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bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words :[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting :

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

[1] From Togan's fascicule written in 1940.

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175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

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the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

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least he makes up much more than a fraction of the population.

The third distinction to remember is that at the time of the Revolution and for some time later, there was in Central Asia no organized indigenous urban proletariat. There was of course a large city population of merchants, traders, craftsmen and *religieux*, but it was the usual medley, without order or arrangement, at best following the medieval guild system to be found in the bazaar quarters of all eastern towns. Such factories as existed — mostly for cotton-ginning and carding — were staffed by Russians, and Russians alone were to be found on the railways and telegraphs. Industry and communications were in Russian hands, and, to cite Stalin himself, the only proletariat of consequence was Russian.

[563] The fact of the matter is that a number of peoples, mainly Turkic peoples — about thirty million in all — have not had time to pass through the period of industrial capitalism and consequently have no industrial proletariat [1].

He followed this up two years later with a conclusion which it might have been inopportune to state on the first occasion.

The conditions now exist enabling these republics which . . . possess no proletariat to establish *with the aid of the Russian proletariat* their own centres of industry in order to create in these centres groups of local proletarians who will serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and the toilers of these republics. In this sphere serious work is required; and talk of schools and language alone is not enough.[1]

This interpenetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the countryside, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along the lines of communications, supplies perhaps the most important clue to an understanding of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia. It is seldom mentioned; indeed Stalin's reference to the bridge-like task of the Russian proletariat is perhaps the nearest we have to an admis-

[1] Stalin speaking on 10th Mar. 1921 and 23rd Apr. 1923 to the Tenth and Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party. Bib. I, 90, pp. 104 and 156.

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limited cultural field was acceptable to Soviet historians and scientists down to 1937. But the Great Russian revival set on foot at the time of the 1937 purges, and developed during and after the War, destroyed such multi-national concepts, and led to the abandonment of theories like that of Marr which drew inspiration from a colonial source. Great Russian chauvinism had won the day.

MISCEGENATION

There is another influence which goes deep. Unlike the English, says Togan,[1] the Russian pursues tactics — to him second nature — of pretending to be the friend of the people among whom he comes. He presents himself as their brother, tries to combine his blood with theirs in marriage, and creeps into intimacy with them. He knows how to suit his language, literature, music and architecture to the native taste. Himself half-Asian, he seeks to deal with the people of Asia as Asians, and in his letters and even in the appearance of his envoys, adopts the mannerisms of Asia. This elastic character and tact is the most menacing side of Russia's domination of Turkistan. He goes on:

> As regards family life the men who mix with Russians often marry Russian women. It is true that mixed marriages between nationals of different countries with common civilization strengthen their cultural inter-connection. But this is a menace to the Turkish idea in Turkistan. If one partner comes from the ruling nation and the other from one inferior politically and economically, it hastens the process of assimilation. Russian women like most Russians are fanatical, nationalistic and despotic. Not only by their caresses, but by their continual nagging at the quality of self-respect which they despise, they reduce their husbands to submission.

A recent account[2] tends to confirm this picture. As sympathizers these visitors took a different view when they met Satpaiev, the Kazak President of the Alma Ata Academy of Sciences, with his Russian wife. Nominally at least this

[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 536 and 586. The author at the moment is speaking of Tsarist times. But a Commissar is as good as a Count.

[2] Coates, *op. cit.* p. 141.

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563 lady was working under her husband in one of his laboratories. But 'My husband is a Kazak,' she said, 'allow me to introduce him'. Behind the comfortable assertions of harmony there lurks the impression that she patronized her husband and treated him as a sort of interesting exhibit. This very Satpaiev is one of those pilloried in the 1951 press for seeking to defend colleagues accused of nationalist deviations. Even the possession of a Russian wife has not availed to protect him, or else the Kazak in him has not been wholly tamed. Many, like Satpaiev, have fallen in the race after they had served their turn.

661 More recently there has been no pretence of the respect-
186 ability of nationalism. The press teems with abuse and diatribes to the address of any public man with a Muslim name who may be held suspect for a display of nationalistic tendencies. Many have been purged. Early examples were Faizullah Khojaev,[1] chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, and Ikramov, secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party. Others have had short shrift. The usual gazette formula applied to men of high place, up to the rank of Premier of a republic, is to say they are 'removed to attend a special study course' or 'for duties elsewhere'. A recent case is that of Abdul jabbar Abdurrahmanov, another chairman of the Council of Ministers in Uzbekistan, a man widely publicized for orthodox views up to 1950 and decorated with the Order of Lenin. He disappeared in April of that year, charged with violation of the constitution and turning the Uzbek Communist Party into an asylum for reactionary elements. At the same time his Deputies, Ghulamov and Kichamov, were mentioned as 'no longer there' when a new government was formed.

As things are, the very word of nationalism is one of the unholy things, and it is a far journey back to the Declaration of 1917. Every force that can be thought of has been applied

[1] For an interesting description of this man in his Soviet hey-day see Bib. I, 66, p. 172.

1 [See cat. 116 pp. 104-05 -- Analyst]

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was to be expected, there is testimony to a certain tension having existed between Uzbek and Kazak, heirs as they are to such very different traditions, but even here the forcing of the Kazaks into settled agriculture and the mines and factories may tend gradually towards assimilation.

Perhaps a fair conclusion would be this: there are, and always have been, very real distinctions of habit, language and bearing between the sedentary population of the towns and oases, who are now mainly Uzbeks and Tajiks, and the men who come from the steppe and mountains, mainly Kazaks, Kirghiz and Turkmens. These differences have been accentuated by Russian policy. But it was proved in 1918–24, and has been proved again in 1941–5, that all these peoples are close enough to work together effectively in a close organism such as an army.[1] On this premise there is ground for supposing that, in spite of differences, trusted leaders may be able to exploit a common tradition to the degree of achieving political unity in action at least when the cry is liberation from a foreign yoke. It is even possible that Russianization may in the end assist this process, as did the introduction of the English language and administration into India. For it by no means follows that the higher Russian education, which provides a new level on which the more intellectual can communicate without regard of race, will cause Kazaks or Uzbeks to think or act as Russians. Judging from the history of World War II, they are more likely to act as Uzbeks and Kazaks, and to believe that freedom is just round the corner.

Finally there is this to be said. There are few emigration groups who have had so great a chance as this national committee to influence directly the hopes and thoughts of so many thousands of their fellow-countrymen over a period of three or four years. Conditions were difficult, the Germans lacked understanding, and after the first two years it was clear that the Eastern Turks had not backed a winning horse. If in spite of this they carried on, and the rank and file fought and died as they did, it proves at least they thought they had a cause to die for. In spiritual terms that cause was the redemption of

[1] [e.g. under the Nazis; see cap. 116, p. 276 ff. — analyst]

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Intermarriage is by far the most effective means of breaking down ethnic barriers. Prior to the Revolution, Russians and Muslims did not intermarry. If the interviews are correct, this continues to be the case today. A number of factors prevent intermarriage: the enormous cultural gap between Russians and Muslims, which ranges from such everyday matters as language, food, and type of residence to more subtle differences of national character and sexual customs; the considerable control which Muslim parents continue to exercise over their female children; and the great difficulty which a mixed family would have in finding a place in the Muslim or Russian community. The informants unanimously agreed that in Central Asia marriage between a Muslim girl and a Russian would be utterly unthinkable, since it would be prevented by the parents and the male relatives of the girl. Several of the refugee informants stated the opinion that a girl who would evade parental disapproval and marry a Russian would be assassinated by her male relatives; one recalled a specific instance of an Uzbek opera star who was killed by her brother for having married a Russian. Intermarriage is considered an insult to the family and to the nation. As one informant put it: "There are never enough girls for all the available Muslim suitors anyway; if a Muslim girl married a Russian that would mean that we weren't good enough for her." [11] None of the informants — who, it must be remembered, came from the ranks of the most Westernized Central Asian Muslims — knew personally any native girl who had married a Russian.

It appears much easier for a Muslim male to marry a Russian woman, and in some cases this happens because of the shortage of Muslim girls and the not inconsiderable number of Russian widows and prostitutes living in Central Asia. But such occurrences, too, seem rather rare. The informants who knew of such cases could recall only instances of Muslims living with Russian women without benefit of formal marriage; such Muslims are largely people whose homes have been broken up and who live with their wives or mistresses outside both Muslim and Russian communities.

The fact that the mere act of marrying an outsider leads to instant exclusion from the two dominant communities and forces the family to live in a social no-man's land is a strong deterrent to intermarriage. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of Russians and Muslims in Central Asia marry persons of their own ethnic group. Intermarriage appears very rare; insofar as it exists at all, it seems confined to the marginal groups of society, to persons who lack families and hence have little contact with their respective ethnic groups, or those who have left Central Asia and taken up residence in other parts of the Soviet Union.

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[11] Indeed, the ratio of males to females in Central Asia was always high: in 1926 the proportion was 10 to 9 in favor of the males. Among the Russians, on the other hand, the ratio is reversed.

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Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time.

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat."

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories.

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible.

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

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701 their ethnic separateness. For many a Muslim, entry into military service
177 represents the first contact with an alien nationality. The Muslim recruit is
563 expected at once to understand Russian commands, even though he is often completely ignorant of Russian. This linguistic difficulty, coupled with the general ineptitude of most Central Asian Muslims for army life (due to the exemption granted them in tsarist days), makes military service for many a shocking and bewildering experience. Sooner or later, however, most Muslims, except the dullest or most recalcitrant, learn enough Russian to get along and communicate with their Russian superiors and comrades. Several of the refugees stated that they had first learned Russian in the army; for some others, the army was actually the first experience with life outside their own Muslim communities. On many recruits the effect of such an experience, though violent, is not long-lasting; having completed his military service, the recruit returns to his village and soon forgets most of what he has learned. For others, however, it constitutes a radical break which affects their entire life. The Red army represents the only Soviet institution — save for the forced labor camps — where Muslim and Russian societies are forcibly compressed together, and where the cultural and ethnic walls usually separating them are to some extent broken down.

697 Evidence obtained from refugees who had lived in Soviet concentration
563 camps and Nazi prisoner-of-war camps indicates that in conditions of great distress the ethnic barriers break down most rapidly, for in neither was there much separation between Muslims and Russians.[12] After an initial period of very harsh treatment by the Germans as "Asiatics," the Central Asians were separated out by the Germans under the influence of Turkestani émigré organizations and were formed into numerous small military units, commanded by Germans; these units served as military police and anti-partisan units and in some cases as front-line combat units.

178 An important factor in the demography of Central Asia is the settlement
162 of the nomadic and seminomadic populations of the steppe and desert regions. The abandonment of nomadic habits had begun long before the Revolution; one of the main themes in the entire history of the Turkic tribes since their appearance in Central Asia and the Middle East a thousand years ago is the gradual transition from pure nomadism to a settled existence. This process was in part caused by the encroachment of agricultural peoples of neighboring territories upon the extensive nomadic lands, with the resultant shrinkage of grazing areas, and in part by the economic advantages to be derived from a combination of cattle and sheep

697 [12] More recent evidence, however, indicates that this has not been the case in Soviet forced
563 labor camps since World War II. Repatriated inmates of Vorkuta, one of the largest Soviet forced labor camps, indicate that national differences are very prominent in the camp, and the prisoners tend to group strictly along national or religious lines. See, for instance, J. Scholmer, *Vorkuta* (New York, 1955). It is not certain whether this contradiction is due to some unknown factors operating in post-World War II camps, or whether there is no clear-cut pattern permitting generalization on this subject.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *Io let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

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Kazakhs. They originate from a mixture of Kazakhs and Tatars, and half of them lead a sedentary life while the other half are nomads.

5) The Kurama constitute neither a particular tribe nor a separate clan of Kazakhs. They are completely sedentary Kazakhs, settled in the Kurama uyezd of the Syr-Darya oblast', [312] along the Chirchik and Angren rivers. The abundance of water and the ease of irrigation were the original reasons for the development [181] of sedentary life here. Being attached to the land, these Kazakhs have mixed with the Sarts, lost all the tradition of their origin and have borrowed their culture from the Sarts. Nevertheless they have not lost the frankness and the sympathetic character of the Kazakhs. This is a very capable and industrious people in the Turkestan region.

6) The Kipchaks are related to the Kirgiz. They live exclusively in the north part of the Fergana oblast', primarily in the Andizhan uyezd, and make up about 10% of the total population of the former Kokand khanate. The Kipchaks, supported by the Kirgiz, nomadizing in the mountains embracing the Fergana valley, played a very important role in all the movements and disturbances which took place in the Kokand khanate before its annexation to Russia. Now this warlike tribe has turned to the peaceful occupations of trade and agriculture.

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7) The Uzbeks constitute 6% of the total population of the Turkestan region. Before the coming of the Russians the leading role in the political and social life belonged to this people. /329/ They constitute the

RL I

162 ruling people even today in the independent
563 khanates. The Khan of Khiva and the Emir of
[173] Bukhara are descendents of the Uzbek descent line of Myn. Nevertheless today they have lost both their political and their tribal significance for the most part. A considerable
162 number of Uzbeks, mixing with Tadzhiks, Kazakhs
101 and other peoples and becoming sedentary, have turned into a special family, so to speak, which is known in Central Asia by the name of the Sarts. The Uzbeks live in greatest density in the Zeravshan okrug where they make up over 40% of the total population. On the right bank of the Amu-Darya in the Amu-Darya otdel, the Uzbeks constitute about 3% of the population and in the Syr-Darya oblast' they are something over 2%.

618 The Uzbeks lead a nomadic form of life, and like the Kazakhs, are divided into clans, lineages and sub-lineages. The late /Ja. V./ Khanykov, on the basis of the book Nassiad-Namiati-Uabekkiia, counted 97 Uzbek tribes, a list of which was appended by him to his well known work Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva (A Description of the Bukharan Khanate). (1)

1. Cf. p. 58ff.

Burnes and Vambery counted 37 Uzbek tribes. Sobolev (2) suggests, quite correctly, that the classification of Uzbek clans can probably never be explained since the two essential sources for this can never be thoroughly reconciled.

2. Geograficheskie i statisticheskie svedeniia o Zeravshanskom okruge (Geographical and statistical information on the Zeravshan okrug) Zapiski imperial'nogo russkogo

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to se-
[311] dentary life. However, because of the elevation of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

167 One can judge the success of the colo-
563 nizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

[1] [In Semirechie - Analyst]

361 surrounding almost every house. By the house
563 there are usually vegetable gardens as well, over which among other things bloom the inevitable sunflowers.

In general, the more well-to-do the peasants, the poorer the Cossacks. Peasants acclimatize relatively quickly and get accus-
[241] tomed to a new environment. The irrigation system of caring for the fields assures good harvests for them, which give them twelve-fold return of wheat. In addition to grain culti-
[691] vation the peasants work in orchards and do vegetable gardening. The only inconvenience suffered by the peasants is the eternal litigation with the nomads over water and land, and the local administration goes to great trouble to pacify the litigants. In general the problem of the limitations of the economy of the nomads and the settlers is the most serious and immediate problem in Semirechie. Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments, the opposing sides do not attempt major damage and it does not lead to serious clashes between them.

563 In recent times the attention of the local administration has been directed toward attracting peasants into the Cossack estate, in order to increase the body of the Semirechie Cossacks. They have been offered various privileges with this in view, but few have wished to join the Cossacks. The Siberian and Orenburg Cossacks may serve as contingents for the reinforcement of the Semirechie Cossack division, for they are already accustomed to the Cossack way of life, so to speak, and they will be given the possibility of moving into the new territory.

361 All the above figures are for 1871. In 1863 there were:

	Stone	Wood
[368] Churches		1
Houses	1	678
[366] Stores and Stalls		55
Mills		32
Totals	1	766

Consequently, in a period of eight years the number of buildings in Vernyy more than doubled.

The number of inhabitants has increased in like proportion.

361 563 /422/ The town of Vernyy is remarkable for the variety of its population. The majority of the inhabitants belong to the Cossack estate. They were the original settlers. After them come the Ukrainians, who arrived recently, and have settled in a special suburb south of the town. One should also add to the number of immigrants here a small number of Chuvash, Mordvinians, Cheremis and other nationalities from the Volga region.

In addition, Vernyy is populated by Tatars, who live in a separate suburb; Sarts, who have come from other towns in the Turkestan region (Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), Chimkent, Tashkent and Kokand), and also from the Kashgar doninions; Kazakhs who have adopted a semi-sedentary life; Kalmyks who came from Kuldja after the Chinese massacre in 1864. Many of the Kalmyks have become Christians. They work in Vernyy primarily as unskilled laborers.

361 There are also Chinese here who have come from
563 the Celestial Empire on commercial business.
Finally, there are Jews, also making their
living in commerce.

361 Here is an inventory of the Vernyy po-
162 pulation by nationality and estate:

In 1871		Male	Female	Total
Aristocracy	Hereditary	109	46	155
	Non-hereditary	71	52	123
Notable Citizens		8	5	13
Secular Clergy		8	12	20
Merchants		174	107	281
Lower Middle Class		1,176	1,306	2,482
Peasants		174	101	275
Colonists		5	3	8
Military Estate		2,512	250	2,762
Cossacks		2,048	1,839	3,887
Soldiers retired or on indefinite leave		583	180	763
Sarts		459	106	565
Chinese		9	3	12
Kazakhs		271	132	403
Kalmyks	Christians	91	52	143
	Non-Christians	107	81	188
/423/ Persons not belonging to the above estates		187	93	280
Transients with passports		194	83	277
	Total	8,186	4,451	12,637

From this table it can be seen that 1) there is a considerable preponderance of the Russian population over the other nationalities; 2) there is a considerable preponderance of males over females. For 100 males here, there are 54 females.

361 fruit, thanks to the southern position of the
132 country. Thus peach trees, apricots, pomegra-
[131] nates, vineyards, apples, pears and mulberry trees grow in the gardens of Kuldja.(1)

1. Footnote lacking.

All these fruits are small, however, and wild, for want of care. In Suidun (Suiting) which is forty versts west of Kuldja, the fruit is incomparably better, because when the Russians came there, the natives began to graft the Suidun fruit trees with the Kuldja ones. Even cotton plants grow in the environs of Kuldja, but their produce is limited because of the lack of enterprise. In Kuldja apricots ripen in the second half of June and peaches at the end of July and the beginning of August.

The prevailing wind is western, that is, from the lower reaches of the Ili. This wind brings humidity and rain with it.

361 Kuldja has a remarkably diversified
563 population. Here, as in all of the Ili valley in general, the most different nationalities are mixed together. Until the beginning of the 1860s, the government /429/ belonged to the Chinese, who dominated the more numerous Dungan and Taranchi peoples.

Conscious of their superiority over the natives, and distinguished by a markedly proud and arrogant character, the Chinese government and officials did not restrain themselves in ways of expressing their sovereignty. The people were overburdened with various taxes. In addition, the inhabitants of the Ili province

361 were obliged to maintain at their own expense
563 the numerous herds of the Chinese Emperor. The property of the population was not safeguarded in any way. If something was pleasing to a Chinese official he took it without any discussion. The same thing happened if the official found the wife or daughter of a Dungan or Taranchi attractive. In addition to all this, the people also suffered other kinds of humiliation. When a person of another nationality met a Chinese, he had to stand if he was sitting, or dismount from his horse, if he were riding. This chain of insults, humiliations and affronts could no longer be born with patience. The Dungans and Taranchi revolted and had a terrible accounting with their oppressors. The central Chinese government, being powerless, remained a non-participating observer of the massacre and the loss of her provinces.

The Dungans, having thrown off the yoke of the Chinese, soon yielded the rule of the Ili province to the Taranchi.

563 The origin of the Dungans is unsolved.
173 The coming of this people into their present abode is lost in the mists of time. There is a tradition in Kuldja that the Dungans came here with Timur and that this hero, when he married a Chinese princess, received the Ili province as a dowry from the Chinese Emperor. The followers obeyed the example of their leader and also married Chinese girls. Later, when Timur went on his way these followers remained and received the land as a gift, as a result of which the Dungans also consider themselves its rightful rulers.

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144 In physical type the Dungans resemble the Turkic peoples, such as the Uzbeks and Sarts, populating Tashkent, Kashgar and other towns in Turkestan, more than they do the Chinese. By religious faith they are Moslems. In everything else - in language, dress and custom - they are true Chinese. Yet, in spite of the fact that they retain the Chinese costume completely, the Ili Dungans keep the Moslem custom of shaving the head and wear a skull cap (tubeteika) on their heads.

/430/ In any case it can be assumed that the Dungans first belonged to a Turkic people and then later mixed with the Chinese and adopted their civilization. Then, since the Chinese are the most passive people in the world in the matter of religion, while the Moslems, on the other hand are primarily fanatics, the Dungans took everything from the Chinese, but kept their old religious faith.

The Taranchi are purely Turkic in nationality. They were transferred to this area in the middle of the last century from eastern Turkestan (from the towns of Turfan, Ak-Su, Kashgar and others) in order to develop grain growing and agriculture in the Ili valley, which had been ruined and conquered shortly before then by the Chinese. The word "tarancha" in Chinese means "worker". By order of the Chinese government most of the people transferred were criminals and in general men of bad morals. About 7000 families of these settlers were sent out. By marrying Dungans they multiplied, became stronger, and were even able to wrest the power from the Dungans after the Chinese massacre.

8:Kostenko 151-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestar RL1

[Kuldja]

563 Having lived in the midst of Chinese
177 civilization and in Chinese surroundings, the Taranchi, both in Kuldja and in other towns in the Ili province, have taken over very much from the Chinese. Their wives walk about the streets with their faces uncovered, in spite of the strict precept of the shariat to cover the face with a thick veil. In the houses, a somewhat improved furnishing has been introduced: plank beds have been put up in the rooms, tables have been added, stools, and even easy chairs of the simplest construction. Also in matters of dress the Taranchi do not hold strictly to the precepts of the Koran, and they have learned to change the wide and awkward khalat for the shorter and more convenient kaftan from time to time. In addition, the Chinese taught the Taranchi the use of coal for fuel and factory production, etc., etc.

The Taranchi are the predominant population of Old Kuldja. This is also why the appearance of the town is not purely Chinese
[346] in character. It is notable that the two main mosques in Kuldja are built in a pure Chinese style, while the Chinese idol temple looks like the lowest sort of hovel.

361 There are a very few buildings left in
342 Kuldja built of fire brick with ornamental figures, and with tile roofs. These were already built by the Chinese. Almost all the houses are adobe, /431/ with roofs made of reeds, squat, dark, unsightly, a type which is common among the buildings of the Moslems in Central Asian towns.

361 In the town are two bazaars: the Taranchi

361 The basic population of Samarkand is
563 Tadzhik, a people of Iranian provenience, and after them come the Uzbeks. The Jews, whose houses here number up to 300, live in a special quarter, as they do in many other towns in Central Asia, and this quarter is distinguished for its extreme dirtiness. In addition one can meet Kipchaks, Arabs, Persians, Gypsies, Afghans and Hindus on the streets of Samarkand.

361 Samarkand carries on quite a large trade
438 in cotton, silk, wheat and rice, and also in
437 knives, fruit, horses, sheep and donkeys. Wheat, rice and silk go primarily to Bukhara; cotton travels through Tashkent to Russia. Excellent fruit is imported here from the Bukharan province of Shakhrisyabs, south of Samarkand, as well as pomegranates and pomegranate cork, used for dye. Wheat and silk textiles are also imported from there. /441/ Salt is imported from the Hissar province which is famous for its good quality.

361 The total number of houses in Samarkand is 4,411, of which 201 are Russian, and the rest are native houses.

[162] There are 30,530 native inhabitants of Samarkand, and 5,380 Europeans, making a total of 35,910 persons of both sexes.

361 The industry of Samarkand is shown in
438 the number of factories, machine and handi-
366 craft workshops, stalls and other industrial and commercial undertakings, which are in the native part of town.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL 1

India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Government of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

S.U. 631 563 T. 631 563 to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. 717 814 177 S.U. 563 658 Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. 563 T. 177 626 The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

T. 665 * At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

T. of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in
871 methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school
555 training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek,
[191] Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage
S.U. in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete
871 command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when
563 trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his
555 mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the
S.U. 563 Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the
554 Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain
T. privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important
563 key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local
554 ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

T. [517] The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the
Ka. Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan,
101 which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral
000 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

VI. THE MINORITIES OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Tu 563 S.U 563

The problem of national minorities is of great importance for the Central Asiatic Republics. Each of the five Central Asiatic 'state nations' has minorities in the other four republics. Some of them are numerically fairly large, such as the Uzbeks in Kirghizistan and Tadzhikistan, or the Turkmenians in Uzbekistan.

In addition there are minorities who have their national territories outside Soviet Central Asia, but inside the U.S.S.R., such as Tartars, Mordvinians, Armenians, etc. Finally, there are ethnical groups who have no national republic either in Central Asia or anywhere else in the Soviet Union. These peoples, the bulk of whom live outside the U.S.S.R., are of considerable interest since they occupy a definite, even if subordinate, place in Russia's policy towards her Central-Asiatic neighbours. Into this category fall the Uigurs and Dungans, who live in Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan and Uzbekistan. Another nationality which may eventually become a tool of Soviet foreign policy are the Baluchis of Turkmenistan. There are also Arabs in Uzbekistan, who theoretically could be a formidable weapon in the hands of Soviet diplomacy, but who for practical reasons could not play this part.*

UIGURS AND DUNGANS

Tu 563 [101]

The Uigurs, a Turkic people racially related to the Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks, and the Dungans, of mixed Arab and Persian origin, who had kept the Moslem faith but adopted the Chinese tongue, are both peoples of Western China. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the two peoples endeavoured to shake off Chinese rule and set up independent Khanates of their own. When these attempts failed, many Dungans and Uigurs fled into Russian territory. A particularly heavy exodus of the Uigurs took place when, in 1881, Russia restored to China the Kuldzha border district which she had occupied during the Western Chinese troubles of 1871.

The Uigurs and Dungans were readily granted Russian citizenship and

* All these minorities already lived in Central Asia under the Czarist régime. The Soviet Government added to them some other ethnical groups who had not been previously associated with Central Asia. Their members came to the Central Asiatic Republics as inmates of forced labour camps, as evacuees during the war, and also as more or less voluntary settlers. A particularly interesting community formed by the latter is a Korean minority which has been living in the Kzyl Orda Province of Kazakhstan since 1928. The Koreans of Kazakhstan are very successful rice-growers and their collective farms, bearing such names as 'Bolshevik', 'Third International' and 'Gigant', have acquired a certain fame.[46] Other Korean groups have settled more recently and perhaps less voluntarily in the Khorezm Province and in the Tashkent Province of Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan Koreans are mostly cotton planters. Politically the Central Asiatic Koreans are without influence, except for one Korean deputy in the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

[Uigur]
[Dungan]

land for settlement purposes as well as exemptions from taxes for a period of ten years. The new subjects of the Russian Empire proved to be an asset, both economically and culturally, in South-East Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan. After 1881, in the Semirechie district on the skirts of China, the Uigurs founded sixty settlements. Most of the settlements survived the revolution and Soviet statistics mention the existence of forty-five Uigur villages in the same area. They are forming a 'Uigur National District' which is part of the Alma Ata Province of Kazakhstan. The Uigurs also have over sixty National Collective Farms in Uzbekistan. Tu. 563

The total number of Uigurs in the Soviet Union, together with ethnical groups who are practically identical with them, can be placed with some certainty in the neighbourhood of 100,000. In regard to the Dungans, Soviet statistics mention a total figure of 14,600 for the whole Soviet Union, but that figure would seem to be an understatement. The Dungans have been allotted a special 'National District' in Kazakhstan and have fifteen National Collective Farms in Kirghizistan.[59] Tu. 162

Considering their small numerical strength the two national minorities enjoy the use of a comparatively large number of cultural institutions. As many as five newspapers, two theatres (one each in Alma Ata and Andizhan) and two teachers' training colleges are at the disposal of the Uigurs, while the Dungans have two newspapers and a teachers' training college in addition to a Dungan department in the teachers' training college of Frunze. An Uigur-Dungan department has also been attached to the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan. Tu. 563 658

Such liberality by the Soviet authorities may be explained by the political-military role of considerable importance which, in addition to the economic and cultural one, the Uigurs and Dungans had all along been called to play. Having settled down in the Russo-Chinese frontier area the Uigurs and Dungans took upon themselves the tasks usually reserved for Russian and Ukrainian settlers. In the cultural and economic fields the Uigurs and Dungans exercised a stabilizing and beneficial influence on their nomad surroundings. In the domain of politics, thanks to their anti-Chinese outlook, they provided Russian frontier districts with a human wall as reliable as if composed of Russian colonists themselves. S.U. 563 721

From the point of view of Soviet diplomatic strategy the Uigurs, who are the largest people in multi-national Sinkiang, are by far the more important of the two. The 2,900,000 Uigurs of Sinkiang are, however, split up into a large number of communities so isolated from each other that it has been difficult to deal with them as a real national unit. Soviet nationalities policy, taking the Soviet Uigurs as a basis, may assist them to develop a clearer national consciousness. S.U 563 648

During the decade of active Soviet interference (1933–43) in the

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[Uigur]
[Baluchi]

S.U. 563 649 internal affairs of Sinkiang, certain progress was made in that direction mainly by means of forming national Uigur clubs, introducing Soviet textbooks in the new local schools and educating a certain number of young Sinkiang Uigurs in Tashkent and Alma Ata. The non-existence of an actual Uigur national movement in Sinkiang deprived Soviet policy of a reliable basis and made it depend almost exclusively on the assistance of the pro-Soviet Chinese governor – Shan Shi-tsai.

As in numerous other territories, so too in Sinkiang, Soviet anti-religious policy conflicted with Soviet policy on nationalities. The closing of mosques and the persecution of mullahs which was carried out during the period of the *de facto* Soviet protectorate antagonized the Sinkiang Moslems whose goodwill Russia might otherwise have won.[60]

After the authority of the Chinese central Government had been re-established in the province in 1943–44, it was not the Uigur population but the 319,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang who played the Russian game. In 1946, with the more or less open support of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs succeeded in obtaining a wide measure of local autonomy in three of the ten districts of Sinkiang, thus virtually dividing the province into two. Any further important Soviet action with the design of eliminating Chinese rule in Sinkiang altogether, would undoubtedly hinge on those 'brothers' of the peoples of the Soviet Union who inhabit the province; these include, in addition to the Uigurs and the Kazakhs, 65,000 Kirghiz, 9,000 Tadzhiks and 92,000 Dungans. Since the establishment of Chinese communist rule in Sinkiang the Soviet cultural tutelage over that province has not come to an end but has become more effective. It is conducted more openly than ever before through a special Soviet cultural mission and through the Sinkiang branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. These two bodies have imported into Sinkiang large numbers of books, magazines and posters, particularly in the Uigur and Kazakh languages.

BALUCHIS

The existence of a few thousand Baluchis in Soviet Central Asia may be of some value from the point of view of Soviet policy towards Persia and Pakistan.

S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563 There are 200,000 Baluchis in Persian Baluchistan and 500,000 in the Indian province of the same name. However small the number of the Baluchis in the Soviet Union may be they represent an asset for Soviet policy in so far as they can be called upon to form part of a communist vanguard both in Persia and Pakistan if and when required. In Turkmenistan the Baluchis have nine National Village Soviets and twenty-three schools, where the Baluchi language is taught in the first

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[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 648 Tu. 563

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [191]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 659 771

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Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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